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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in affirming the 
district court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict, thereby 
finding that there was no competent evidence to support the 
verdict and that a violation of a statute is negligence per se? 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 45 states: 
Rule 45. Review of judgments, orders9 and 
decrees of Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the 
review of a judgment, an order, and a decree 
(herein referred to as "decisions") of the 
Court of Appeals shall be intitiated by a 
petition for a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 46 states; 
Rule 46. Considerations governinig review of 
certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a 
matter of right, but of judicial discretio, 
and will be granted only for special and 
important reasons. The following, while 
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the 
character of reasons that will be considered: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another 
panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has decided a question of of 
state or federal law in a way that is in 
conflict with a decision of the Supreme 
Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of 
Appeals has rendered a decision that has 
so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings or 
has so far sanctioned such a departure 
by a lower court as to call for an 
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of 
supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has 
decided an important question or 
municipal, state, or federal law which 
has not been, but should be, settled by 
the Supreme Court. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50 states: 
Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and 
for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when 
made; effect. A party who moves for a 
directed verdict at the close of the evidence 
offered by an opponent may offer evidence in 
the event that the motion is not granted, 
without having reserved the right so to do 
and to the same extent as if the motion had 
not been made. A motion for a directed 
verdict which is not granted is not a waiver 
of trial by jury even though all parties to 
the action have moved for directed verdicts. 
A motion for a directed verdict shall state 
the specific ground[s] therefor. The order of 
the court granting a motion for a directed 
verdict is effective without any assent of 
the jury. 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. Whenever a motion for a 
directed verdict made at the close of all the 
evidence is denied or for any reason is not 
granted, the court is deemed to have 
submitted the action to the jury subject to a 
later determination of the legal questions 
raised by the motion. Not later than ten days 
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after entry of judgment, a party who has 
moved for a directed verdict may move to have 
the verdict and any judgment entered thereon 
set aside and to have judgment entered in 
accordance with his motion for a directed 
verdict; or if a verdict was not returned 
such party, within ten days after the jury 
has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion for a directed 
verdict. A motion for a new trial may be 
joined with this motion, or a new trial may 
be prayed for in the alternative. If a 
verdict was returned the court may allow the 
judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment 
and either order a new trial or direct the 
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict 
had been directed. If no verdict was returned 
the court may direct the entry of judgment 
as if the requested verdict had been directed 
or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant 
of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, provided 
for in subdivision (b) of this Rule, is 
granted, the court shall also rule on 
the motion for a new trial, if any, by 
determining whether it should be granted 
if the judgment is thereafter vacated or 
reversed, and shall specify the grounds 
for granting or denying the motion for a 
new trial. If the motion for a new trial 
is thus conditionally granted, the order 
thereon does not affect the finality of 
the judgment. In case the motion for a 
new trial has been conditionally granted 
and the judgment is reversed on appeal, 
the new trial shall proceed unless the 
appellate court has otherwise ordered. 
In case the motion for a new trial has 
been conditionally denied, the 
respondent on appeal may assert error in 
that denial; and if the judgment is 
reversed on appeal, subsequent 
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proceedings shall be in accordance with 
the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been 
set aside on motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
59 not later than ten days after entry 
of the judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on 
that motion may, as respondent, assert 
grounds entitling him to a new trial in the 
event the appellate court concludes that the 
trial court erred in denying the motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If the 
appellate court reverses the judgment, 
nothing in this Rule precludes it from 
determining that the respondent is entitled 
to a new trial, or from directing the trial 
court to determine whether a new trial shall 
be granted. 
Section 41-6-73 of the Utah Code states: 
Vehicle turning left — Yield right-
of-way. 
The operator of a vehicle intending to 
turn to the left shall yield the right-of-way 
to any vehicle approaching from the opposite 
direction which is so close to the turning 
vehcile as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Rhodes v. Fry, Slip Opinion, Case No. 890473-CA (dated 
September 18, 1990). See Appendix A. 
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JURISDICTION 
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to allow 
the Utah Supreme Court to review the Utah Court of Appeal's 
affirmance, entered September 18, 1990, of a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict entered by the Honorable Boyd L. 
Parks of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State 
of Utah, The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(3) of the Utah Code. See, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a personal injury 
action based upon a two-vehicle accident at an intersection in 
Orem, Utah. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. This 
matter was tried by jury in front of the Honorable Boyd L. Park. 
After a trial on disputed facts and disputed expert opinion, the 
jury found the Defendant/Appellant, John M. Fry (hereinafter 
"Fry"), not negligent. Thereafter the trial court entered a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the 
Plaintiff/Respondent, Harold Edwin Rhodes (hereinafter 
"Plaintiff"). Fry appealed seeking a reversal of the judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict entered by the trial court (in the 
face of disputed evidence), and reinstatement of the jury verdict 
5 
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in his favor. The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the 
Utah Court of Appeals, who affirmed the judgment of the district 
court without opinion purusant to Rule 31 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 31. Fry now petitions 
this court for a writ of certiorari. 
C. Statement of Facts. Note, subsequent to receiving 
the briefing schedule by the Court of Appeals, it was determined 
that the trial transcript for the second day of trial, November 
29, 1988, had not been submitted by the reporter. The transcript 
was received, but the original was not numbered in accordance 
with Rule 11(b) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. As a 
result, references to that transcript are hereinafter ("TR, pg. 
1. This accident occurred at the intersection of 1300 
South and Main Streets in Orem, Utah County, State of Utah on or 
about December 11, 1982. (R-559, pg. 47). 
2. Third-party Defendant Petersen (hereinafter 
"Peterson") was the driver of a 1966 Volkswagen which was 
involved in the collision with a 1979 Chevrolet CIO pickup truck, 
driven by Fry. (TR, pg. 6). 
3. Fry was westbound on 1300 South and intended to 
turn left or south. (TR, pg. 36). 
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4. Plaintiff was a passenger in the Volkswagen driven 
by Peterson. (TR, pg. 55). 
5. Substantial evidence existed that Fry was not 
negligent in the subject incident: 
a) Fry testified that as he approached the 
intersection, the light turned red. He stopped and waited 
through the cycle of the light. (TR, pg. 36). 
b) During the time he was stopped at the red 
light, he was looking for on-coming traffic. He saw none with 
the exception of a brown station wagon. (TR, pg. 37) 
c) The brown station wagon was approaching from 
the west and was turning left or northbound. Fry saw no other 
headlights or vehicles coming, so he started to make his turn. 
(TR, pp. 41, 44). 
d) Petersen normally travelled in the left hand 
lane of traffic. (TR, pg. 19). However, the collision occurred 
in the eastbound traffic's far right lane in the intersection. 
(R-559, pg. 58). 
e) Shelley Lambert, Fry's passenger, testified 
that she was looking for on-coming traffic and saw none. (TR, 
pg. 41; TR, pp. 109, 110). 
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f) Fry's expert testified that the Volkswagen in 
question was obscured from Fry's sight by other traffic. (R-
497) . 
6. Prior to the impact, Petersen attempted to avoid 
the accident by braking. (R-559, pg. 51). 
7. The experts called by Plaintiff disagreed with 
Fry's description of his actions (TR, pg. 36; TR, pg. 156), with 
the speed at which Fry proceeded into the intersection, (TR, pg. 
39, TR, pg. 157), with the speed at which the Volkswagen was 
traveling prior to braking, (R-560, pg. 26; R-560, pg. 36; $-493; 
TR, pg. 167), and with the cause of the accident (R-559, pg. 57; 
TR, pg. 169; R-497). 
8. Plaintiffs' experts testified that, based upon 
their calculations, Fry was negligent. (R-559, pg. 57; TR, pg. 
169). Fry's expert testified that, based on his calculations, 
Fry was not negligent. (R-467). 
9. The jury was instructed on the issues of negligence 
(R-357, 358). The court further instructed the jury that the 
mere fact that an accident happened does not support an inference 
that the defendants, or any party, was negligent. (R-363). The 
court refused to instruct the jury on unavoidable accident. (R-
304, 385). 
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10. Petersen made a motion for a directed verdict 
which was granted. (R-387). 
11. Plaintiff made a motion for directed verdict based 
upon: the stipulation that Plaintiff, as a passenger in the 
Petersen vehicle, was not negligent; the court's ruling as a 
matter of law that a case had not been proven against Petersen; 
and the court's refusal to instruct the jury on "unavoidable 
accident". (R-292). 
12. The court took Plaintiff's motion for directed 
verdict under advisement and submitted the matter to the jury. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Fry when it answered "No" 
to the Special Verdict instruction #1 which stated: 
1. At the time and place of the 
incident in question and under the 
circumstances as shown by the evidence, was 
defendant, John M. Fry, negligent? 
Yes No X 
(R-385). 
13. The court subsequently entered a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the plaintiff (R-442), 
from which Fry appealed. See Appendix B. 
14. The Utah Court of Appeals, on a Rule 31 hearing, 
affirmed the judgment of the district court. Rhodes, Slip 
Opinion at 1. 
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ARGUMENT 
Fry petitions the Utah Supreme Court for a writ of 
certiorari to review various errors the Utah Court of Appeals 
made by affirming the judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the 
district court. 
As set forth above, Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure identifies various reasons the Utah Supreme 
Court will consider in granting a writ of certiorari. In the 
present case, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in 
conflict with decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and of other 
panels of the Court of Appeals on the same questions of law and 
has sanctioned a departure by the district court from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings so as to call 
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (see 
Appendix C), made by Judge Park, are unclear as to his basis for 
finding Fry negligent as a matter of law. Two such basis can be 
inferred from his findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Findings of Fact 6-15 suggest that Judge Park based his decision 
on the "fact" that, as a matter of law, Fry violated section 41-
6-73 of the Utah Code and that such a violation was negligence 
per se. However, some of these same findings of fact, 
particularly findings 11, 12 and 14, and conclusion of law 3, 
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indicating that "reasonable minds could not differ" in finding 
Fry negligent suggest that, as a matter of law, no competent 
evidence existed to support the verdict in favor of Fry* Note 
that it is unclear whether Judge Park based his finding that 
"reasonable minds could not differ" (in finding Fry negligent) 
upon the assumption that a violation of the statute is negligence 
per se, or upon the "fact" that there was no competent evidence 
to support the verdict. Plaintiff contends that a finding that a 
violation of a statute is negligence per se is contrary to Utah 
law and that there was competent evidence to support the verdict. 
POINT I. 
THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS 
THE VERDICT, 
We first address Judge Park's findings, suggested by 
his findings of facts and conclusions of law, that there was no 
competent evidence to support the verdict. 
At the close of Fry's case in chief, the Plaintiff 
moved, pursuant to Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
for a directed verdict. The trial court took Plaintiff's motion 
for a directed verdict under advisement and submitted the matter 
to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Fry. The 
court subsequently entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
in favor of Plaintiff. Rule 50(b) states in part: 
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(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict• Whenever a motion for directed 
verdict made at the close of all the evidence 
is denied or for any reason is not granted, 
the court is deemed to have submitted the 
action to the jury subject to a later 
determination of the legal questions raised 
by the motion. . . . If a verdict was 
returned the court may allow the judgment to 
stand or may reopen the judgment and either 
order a new trial or direct the entry of 
judgment as if the requested verdict had been 
directed. . . . 
Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b). 
The standard that the trial court must apply when 
considering a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
is set out in Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). In 
that case, the court stated: 
The standard to be applied by the trial court 
in determining whether to grant a motion for 
a j.n.o.v. is stricter than the standard for 
deciding to grant a new trial. A j.n.o.v. 
can be granted only when the losing party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
Id. at 17. The trial court should grant a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict only if, after viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the non-movant, it finds that no 
competent evidence supports the verdict. In reviewing the trail 
court's determination of such issues, the Court of Appeals must 
apply the same standard. King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 620 
(Utah 1987). In addition to viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the non-movant, the court must accord every 
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reasonable inference fairly drawn from the evidence the same 
degree of deference. Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah 
1983) . 
In determining whether or not to grant such a motion, 
the court is not allowed to weigh the evidence or to determine 
which witnesses it feels are the most persuasive or truthful. 
The Court of Appeals of Ohio in Cox v. Oliver Machinery Co., 41 
Ohio App. 3d 28, 534 N.E.2d 855 (1987) stated: 
In ruling on a directed verdict — or, in our 
case considering such a ruling on appeal — a 
court must construe the evidence most 
strongly in favor of the non-moving party and 
determine whether reasonable minds can come 
but to one conclusion on the evidence 
submitted, that conclusion being adverse to 
non-moving party. If reasonable minds can 
reach different conclusions, the matter must 
be submitted to the jury. The court 
considers the motion without weighing the 
evidence or determining the creditability of 
witnesses. A motion for directed verdict 
raises a question of law because it examines 
the materiality of the evidence rather than 
the conclusions to be drawn from the 
evidence. Thus, the court does not determine 
whether one version of the facts presented is 
more persuasive than another; rather, it 
determines whether only one result can be 
reached under the theories of law presented 
in the complaint. 
Id. at , 534 N.E.2d at 857-58 (citations omitted). 
As stated in Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co., 701 
P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), "[wjhere evidence is in conflict in a jury 
trial, we assume that the jury believed those facts that support 
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its verdict, and we view the facts and the reasonable inferences 
that arise from those facts in a light most supportive of the 
jury's verdict." Id. at 1082 (citations omitted). 
Fry's theory of the case was that his view of the 
oncoming traffic was obstructed by another vehicle and that his 
turning left was reasonable under the existing circumstances. In 
support of this theory, competent evidence was presented by Fry, 
supported by the direct testimony of his passenger Shelley 
Lambert and by the expert testimony of Dr. Rudolf Limpert. 
The court's ruling (R-442), in paragraphs 4 and 5, 
illustrates the factual disputes that were presented during the 
course of the trial. Fry testified that while waiting for the 
light to turn green, he looked for oncoming traffic. After the 
light turned green, he proceeded into the intersection. He had 
observed an on-coming station wagon which was making a left turn. 
He looked for any other on-coming vehicles which would have posed 
an immediate hazard and there was none to be seen. He then 
proceeded to make his turn and was struck by the plaintiff's 
vehicle. (See Statement of Facts). 
The passenger in Fry's vehicle, Shelley Lambert, 
testified that she also saw the station wagon start to make a 
left-hand turn. She did not observe any other vehicles which 
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would pose an immediate hazard. She was comfortable with Fry 
proceeding with his turn (TR, pg. 110). 
The defendant's expert witness testified that the 
larger vehicle provided an obstruction which prevented Fry from 
seeing the Petersen vehicle. As a result, his opinion was that 
Fry's actions were not unreasonable. (R-497). In fact, the 
trial judge, in his findings of fact, referred to such competent 
evidence offered by Fry and Dr. Limpert. See, Findings of Fact 
3, 5. 
Thus, the record demonstrates that there was sufficient 
material evidence to support the jury's verdict. The jury found 
that the defendant's actions were reasonable and prudent under 
the conditions that the jury determined existed at the time of 
the accident. By affirming the trail court's judgment entering 
j.n.o.v. in favor of Plaintiff, the Court of Appeals rendered a 
decision that was clearly in conflict with decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court and other decisions of the Court of Appeals, and 
sanctioned the departure by the trial court from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings so as to call for an 
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision. 
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POINT II. 
THE VIOLATION OF A STATUTE IS NOT NEGLIGENCE 
PER SE AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN 
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT, AS 
A 2SATTER OF LAW, THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT 
AND THE ACCIDENT WAS NOT AN UNAVOIDABLE 
ACCIDENT. 
We now address Judge Park's ruling, suggested by his 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, that a violation of the 
statute is negligence per se. 
In discussing this point, it is critical to avoid being 
distracted by the label, "unavoidable accident". The trial court 
became so involved with the term "unavoidable accident" that it 
failed to examine the role which such an instruction plays in a 
negligence claim. In Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Utah 
1980), the Utah Supreme Court held: 
Unavoidable accident, rather than being a 
separate legal doctrine, is simply a 
recognition of the fact that an incident 
causing injury to the plaintiff does not 
necessarily give rise to liability in the 
defendant. Where the injury arises from a 
set of circumstances which do not reflect a 
lack of due care on anyone's part, no 
recovery may had under a theory of 
negligence, the accident being "unavoidable." 
As explained above, a properly drafted 
unavoidable accident instruction punctuates 
the necessity of finding both negligence and 
causation prior to assigning liability. It 
is true that such an instruction amounts, in 
essence, to a reemphasis of principles 
already implicit in other instructions. . . . 
16 
Id, at 834. 
The court, in finding this was not an "unavoidable 
accident" found as a matter of law, that Fry did not keep a 
proper lookout, and that such was a violation of his statutory 
duty pursuant to Section 41-6-73 of the Utah Code, See Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-73 (1981) (amended 1988). These findings, along 
with the other findings and conclusions by the court, in effect, 
hold a violation of this section is negligence per se. 
Before addressing the quesiton of whether a violation 
of the statute is negligence per se, it must first be pointed out 
that the trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that 
Fry did not keep a proper lookout. 
As the Anderson v. Toone court held: 
The law is well settled in our jurisdiction 
that most cases involving negligence are not 
susceptible to summary disposition, finding a 
defendant negligent as a matter of law. . . . 
Plaintiff reasons that defendant's 
failure to keep a proper lookout was 
negligence as a matter of law and thus that 
issue should not have been submitted to the 
jury to be decided. but we have heretofore 
held that what constitutes a proper lookout 
is a question for the jury as the individual 
fact situation in each case does not lend 
itself to a rigid application of any rule, 
but demands instead a determination of the 
conditions as they existed at the time of the 
accident (Cite omitted.) 
Anderson, 671 P.2d at 172. 
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The Utah Supreme Court previously overturned similar 
findings by a trial judge on a claimed failure to maintain a 
proper lookout. In Durrant v. Pelton, 16 Utah 2d 7, 394 P.2d 879 
(1964), the court held: 
However, the test " [a]s to what constitutes a 
proper lookout is usually * * * a latter-day 
classic question for jury determination, and 
each trial and appellate court must determine 
the question as a matter of law only when 
convinced that reasonable persons could not 
disagree upon the question when 
conscientiously apply fact to l a w " . . . . 
A jury should determine what a reasonable and 
prudent person would do under the conditions 
as they existed at the time of the accident. 
Id. at 394 P.2d at 881. 
In Smith v. Galleqos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 
(Utah 1965), the court addressed the same issue presented in 
this appeal. It held: 
Justice does not sanction any such favoring 
of one party at the expense of the other. It 
imposes upon all drivers, including not only 
the left turner, . . . but also upon the 
oncoming vehicle . . . the fundamental duty 
which pervades the entire law of torts and 
from which no one is at any time excused: to 
use that degree of care which a reasonable 
and prudent person would use under the 
circumstances for the safety of himself and 
others. . . . If the left turner in 
performing his duty, and in making the 
required observation, sees no vehicle 
approaching, or that any coming is far enough 
away so that he can reasonably believe that 
he has time to make his turn, he may 
proceed. 
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Id. at , 400 P.2d at 572. 
In King v. Fereday, the plaintiff argued that a rear-
end collision constituted a violation of section 41-6-62 Utah 
Code and amounted to negligence oer se. The court held: 
Plaintiff's argument therefore assumes that 
the fact of the collision alone establishes a 
violation of the state. In McCloud v. Baum, 
this Court held that a collision alone does 
not create an inference of negligence. Id. 
at 1127-28. 
King, 739 P.2d at 620. 
Finally, in Maltbv v. Cox Construction Co., Inc., 598 
P.2d 336 (Utah 1979), the court analyzed plaintiff's jury 
instruction which would have, in effect, directed a verdict in 
their favor. The court held: 
This requested instruction is tantamount 
to an instruction that rear-end collisions 
are invariably the result of the negligence 
of the driver of the following vehicle. The 
instruction was properly refused. The Court 
properly instructed the jury as to the duties 
and responsibilities of each of these parties 
to keep a proper lookout, to keep their 
respective vehicles under proper control, 
and to sue such care as a reasonable prudent 
person would use under the circumstances. 
The jury was persuaded that Pritchard's 
actions were reasonable under these 
circumstances, and that plaintiff's were not. 
Id. at 340. 
In light of the long standing case law in Utah 
spelling out the jury's role to determine what constitutes issues 
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of negligence, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial 
court's finding that Fry "did not keep a proper lookout for 
eastbound on-coming traffic. " 
It was also improper for the Court of Appeals to 
sanction the trial court's implicit holding that a violation of a 
statute is negligence per se. Such a holding is in direct 
conflict with Utah case. As stated in Intermountain Farmers 
Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978). 
[T]he violation of a statute does not 
necessarily constitute negligence per se and 
may be considered only as evidence of 
negligence . . . . [The violation] may be 
regarded as "prima facie evidence of 
negligence, but is subject to justification 
or exuse . . . ." 
Id. at 1164-65 (quoting Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 
30, 395 P.2d 62, 64 (1964)) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals committed error by 
affirming the district court's finding that as a matter of law 
Fry violated the statute and that such a violation was negligence 
per se. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the authorities and discussion above, this 
court shold grant a writ of certiorari for the purpose of 
reviewing the errors made by the Utah Code of Appeals (and the 
district court). 
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Our File No. 14,608 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN M. FRY and JUDITH L. FRY, 
Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILLIAM C PETERSEN, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 64,555 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing before the Court sitting with 
a jury on November 28-30, 1988, and the Court having heard the Motion of plain tiffs 
counsel for a directed verdict and having granted the same by reason of the evidence 
presented, and the jury having heretofore resolved the question of damages regarding 
plaintiff's injuries herein, and after good faith presentation of the evidence by both 
plaintiff and defendant, being fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; the Court does now make and 
enter the following Judgment against defendants John M Fry and Judith L. Fry: 
JUDGMENT 
The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against defendants 
John M. Fry and Judith L. Fry in the amount of 521,000.00 for special damages, 
together with accrued interest on said special damages from the date of the subject 
accident, December 11, 1982, until the date of judgment, at the rate of eight percent 
(8%), and for general damages in the amount of 529,000.00, with interest to accrue on 
the total judgment at the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%), plus court costs 
thereafter. / 
DATED this . / l day of fit*'-- . 1989. 
/ 
BY THE COURT 
BOYtf L. PARK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this day of . 1989. 
Scott W. Christensen, Esq. R. Phil Ivie, Esq. 
Hansoa, Epperson & Smith Ivie & Young 
P. O. Box 2970 P. O. Box 672 
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FRED D. HOWARD (1547), for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
12Q East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Facsimile: (802) 377-4991 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Q:Rhod-FOF.lo 
Our File No. 14,508 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN M. FRY and JUDITH L. FRY, 
Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WILLIAM C. PETERSEN, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 64,555 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing before the Court sitting with 
a jury on November 28-30, 1988, and after a good faith presentation of the available 
evidence by both the plaintiff and the defendants; and the Court having heard the 
Motion of plaintiffs counsel for a directed verdict and having thereafter received 
memoranda of points and authorities by the respective attorneys in support of and in 
opposition to said Motion, and the jury having heretofore resolved the question of 
damages regarding plaintiff's injuries herein, and the Court having taken said Motion 
under advisement, and thereafter having heard oral arguments regarding said Motion, 
and being fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes that all the evidence 
showed defendant William C. Peterson was not negligent and that John M. Fry was 
negligent; and does, therefore, grant PlaintifFs Motion for Directed .Verdict; and it 
does now make and enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about December 11, 1982, the defendant John M. Fry was driving 
a 1979 Chevrolet CIO pickup truck which was involved in a collision with a 1966 two-
door Volkswagen driven by third-party defendant William C. Petersen. The accident 
occurred at the intersection of State Road 265 and Main Street in Orem, Utah at 
approximately 6:22 p.m. The intersection was regulated by traffic lights. 
2. The plaintiff Harold Edwin Rhodes was a passenger in the vehicle driven 
by third-party defendant William C. Petersen. Upon impact, the occupants of the 
Petersen vehicle were all rendered unconscious from the accident and have limited 
memory of the circumstances occurring at the time of the accident. 
3. Prior to the collision, the Fry vehicle was traveling westbound on State 
Road 265, and the Petersen vehicle was travelling eastbound. Defendant Fry testified 
that he brought his vehicle to a stop at the intersection while he faced a red light. 
When the light turned green, he perceived a station wagon approaching that was going 
to make a left turn. Defendant Fry stated he did not see the Petersen vehicle and, 
therefore, proceeded to turn to the left across the eastbound lane of travel of the 
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Petersen vehicle. In an attempt to avoid defendant Fry's vehicle as it turned in front 
of Petersen's vehicle, Petersen applied the brakes and his vehicle laid down 35 feet 11 
inches of tire skid marks before the point of impact between the two vehicles. (See 
Exhibits 2 and 10.) 
4. The Court finds from the testimonies of the investigating officer, Fran 
Fillmore, and accident ^constructionists, Newell Knight and Greg DuVal, that defen-
dant Fry was negligent. 
5. John M. Fry's expert accident reconstructionist, Rudolph Limpert, stated 
on direct examination when asked: "Based on your experience in accident investigation 
and reconstruction, what caused this accident?": 
A set of unfortunate circumstances, a vehicle driving 
behind a station wagon, a large domestic or American 
station wagon that's some distance behind. One could 
calculate how small that Volkswagen is in relationship to 
the perspective of that big car, the station wagon 
obstructing its view. And then the unfortunate accident 
"occurred. So I*'don't see anything unreasonable in terms 
of the left turn by Mr. Fry when he made the left turn. 
(Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings* Testimony of Rudolph Limpert, November 29, 
1988, 2:10 p.m. transcribed p. 30.) 
6. The Court notes that the jury by Special Verdict found defendant John 
M. Fry not negligent. The jury finding, together with the Court's instruction to the 
jury, that the plaintiff was not negligent as stipulated by the parties and further, that 
the Court had found as a matter of law defendant Petersen was not negligent, resulted 
in what would have to be termed an unavoidable accident. The Court had refused to 
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give an unavoidable accident instruction. The jury further found plaintiff Harold E. 
Rhodes incurred 521,000.00 in special damages and 529,000.00 in general damages. 
7. Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-73, which was submitted as Jury Instruction No. 
23, states: 
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left 
shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching 
from the opposite direction which is so close to the 
turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard. 
8. This Court finds that Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-73, is applicable to the 
case at bar and creates a statutory duty on all operators of motor vehicles who make 
left hand turns to *. . . yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the 
opposite direction which is so close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an im-
mediate hazard." 
9. This Court also follows the ruling in French v. Utah Oil Ref. Co.. 117 
Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1950) wherein the Utah Supreme Court held: 
. . . a burden is placed on the driving making the turn as 
he has control of the situation, and if there is a reason-
able probability that the movement cannot be made in 
safety then the disfavored driver should yield. The driver 
proceeding straight ahead has little opportunity to know a 
vehicle is to be turned across his path until the movement 
is commenced and in many instances, the warning is too 
late for the latter driver to take effective action. 
10. The Court also adheres to the rationale of Yeatcs v. Budge. 122 Utah 
518, 252 P.2d 220 (1953) wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that where a defendant 
attempted to turn across the path of the plaintiff, when he was only 40 feet away, the 
trial court could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff was so close as to constitute an 
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immediate hazard and that the defendant should have yielded the right-of-way to him. 
11. This Court is reluctant to take from the jury its fact finding respon-
sibility regarding negligence of the parties and whether the negligence was a proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. The Court is mindful of those cases in which the Supreme 
Court has concluded that juries should be fact finders. (Mel Hardman Productions. Inc. 
v. Robinson. 604 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1979).) 
12. The Court, however, given all the testimony of the witnesses, finds that 
the matter is one in which reasonable minds could not differ, and in fairness and 
equity, cannot find that this accident was an unavoidable accident. The Utah Supreme 
Court has defined an unavoidable accident as ". . . an unusual and unexpected occur-
rence 'which result[sj in injury and which happenfs] without anyone failing to exercise 
reasonable care . . ." (Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corporation. 681 P.2d 1232, 1237 
(Utah 1984); and Stringham v. Broderick. 529 PL2d 425, 426 (Utah 1974). 
13. Even should this Court ignore the testimony of those witnesses who 
testified that defendant Fry was negligent and look only to the testimony of Fry's 
witness, Rudy Limpert, (according to his calculations this was an unfortunate accident), 
this Court is of the opinion that the accident was not an unavoidable accident as 
defined by the Supreme Court of this state. 
14. The Court finds that given ail the evidence reasonable men could not 
differ in finding that the defendant John M. Fry made a left hand turn across on-
coming traffic heading eastbound along State Road 265 and did not keep a proper 
lookout for eastbound on-coming traffic which resulted in his colliding with third-party 
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defendant William C. Petersen's vehicle, thus violating his statutory duty pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-73. 
15. The Court also finds that the jury was confused in its application of the 
jury instructions to the facts of the case by essentially concluding the collision to be 
an unavoidable accident. 
16. The Court further finds that plaintiff Harold Edwin Rhodes is entitled to 
his directed verdict against defendants holding that defendant John M. Fry negligently 
operated his vehicle which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 
17. The Court finds that at the time of the accident, December 11, 1982, 
John M. Fry was the operator of a vehicle as a minor under 18 years of age; and this 
his mother, Judith L. Fry, signed John M Fry's driver's license application. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS-OFEAW 
1. The Court concludes that the plaintiff Harold Edwin (Hal) Rhodes was 
not negligent. 
2. The Court concludes that the third-party defendant William C. Petersen 
was not negligent. 
3. The Court concludes that reasonable minds could not differ regarding the 
liability of the defendant and third-party plaintiff John M. Fry and concludes the same 
to be negligent and that said negligence was the proximate cause of the accident in 
question and of plaintiff's injuries. 
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4. The Court concludes that by law, liability of John M Fry is imputed to 
defendant and third-party plaintifff Judity L. Fry under Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-115(2). 
5. The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against 
defendants John M. Fry and Judith I- Fry in the amount of S21,000.00 for special 
damages, together with accrued interest on said special damages from the date of the 
subject accident, December 11, 1982, until the date of judgment, at the rate of eight 
percent (8%), and for general damages in the amount of 529,000.00, with interest to 
accrue on the total judgment at the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%), plus court 
costs thereafter. 
DATED this _ / day of Aprf£ 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
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